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(CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF)

JP(61)107(Final)

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17th August, 1961

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions⁺ of the Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE, drawn up a draft directive for LIVE OAK, indicated what future directions will be required from the Ambassadorial Group, Washington or Governments to LIVE OAK, and examined the provision of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group.

2. In compiling our report, which is at Annex, we have consulted the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should authorize its use, when appropriate, in any future discussions on Berlin Contingency Planning.

(Signed) E.V.M. STRICKLAND
D.C. STAPLETON
W.D. O'BRIEN.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(61)53rd Mtg., Min. 1(CA)

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNINGINTRODUCTION

1. At the preliminary meetings of the Working Group in Paris the United States delegation tabled two draft papers¹ in preparation for the meeting of Foreign Ministers:-

- (a) Military Planning and Preparations towards a Berlin Crisis.
- (b) Draft instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

2. These papers are attributed to Mr. Paul Nitze, United States Assistant Secretary for Defence, and it would appear that they have not been agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff². They were discussed by the Working Group but were not accepted for tabling to the Foreign Ministers; it is likely however that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington will consider the questions raised in the papers of the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE and the issue of a new directive for the former.

3. The preliminary and unofficial reactions of General Horstad to the papers have been received³. We agree with him that it is essential first for the political aim to be clearly defined, and then for military decision on the type and scope of military activities to meet the aim.

4. From the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Paris the following four issues emerged:-

- (a) The means for concerting and co-ordinating the planning and execution of military measures beyond the competence of LIVE OAK.
- (b) The means of ensuring continuity of military control during a transition from tripartite Berlin measures to control by established NATO mechanisms, if and when necessary.
- (c) The means of effecting co-ordinated political guidance and control of military activity world-wide during the Berlin crisis.
- (d) The preparation of a new directive for LIVE OAK and other military authorities.

5. Our examination excludes 4(c) above and the new directive to other military authorities referred to in 4(d).

AIM

6. To define the future relationship between LIVE OAK and SHAPE; to draw up a draft revised directive for LIVE OAK; to indicate what future direction will be required from the Ambassadorial Group in Washington or Governments to LIVE OAK and to examine the provision of military advice for the Ambassadorial Group.

- ① COS 964/4/8/61, Annex A and B
- ② Paris to Foreign Office Telegram No. 412 of 3rd August, 1961
- ③ UKFMR 334

Annex (Continued)RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIVE OAK
AND SHAPEGeneral

7. The instructions for LIVE OAK in the original directive² were that the Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General Norstad, should:-

- (a) Be responsible for planning and co-ordinating quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures which would not create public alarm but would be detectable by Russian intelligence (Paragraph 1(a)).
- (b) Plan more elaborate military measures in Europe which would be generally observable including:-
 - (i) Measures to be implemented after the Soviet Government has turned its functions over to the GDR.
 - (ii) Measures to be implemented after allied traffic has been forcibly obstructed. (Paragraph 1(b)).
- (c) Plan the initial probe of Soviet intentions to be made in the event of interruption of allied surface access (Paragraph 9).
- (d) Study the measures required to restore freedom of passage (Paragraph 11(a)).
- (e) Assist the Three Embassies at Bonn to plan air access measures (Paragraph 12(b)). The LIVE OAK responsibility was subsequently defined³ as contingency planning for air access after the Soviets or GDR have attacked or physically obstructed tripartite aircraft in the air corridors.
- (f) To assist the three Embassies at Bonn to carry out their responsibilities under the directive (Paragraph 13(c)).

Planning

8. In a supplementary brief⁴ for the use of the CIGS in Paris, we considered that the approach to the Berlin problem was in two related parts. Access and the maintenance of a Western military presence in the city was a tripartite responsibility. The wider military plans needed to achieve and exploit a general position of strength should be concerted on a NATO basis. Thus LIVE OAK should remain responsible as a separate entity as at present for planning ground access measures and some aspects of air access in conjunction with CINC MAOR and CINCUSAFE. Any wider participation (apart, of course, from the Federal Republic which has a special position) in military planning without responsibility for execution, before the stage at which NATO as a whole needed to become directly involved, would not only

² Annex to COS 541/10/4/59

³ COS(59)199

⁴ COS(61)252

Annex (Continued)

complicate planning but would also infringe the responsibility of the Three Powers. We considered, however, that Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, all of whom contribute forces to the Central Region, should be made aware of the plans through their National Military Representative at SHAPE, and the Germans through their LIVE OAK Liaison Officer.

9. We had also previously concluded⁸ that if the Russians were to be convinced of Western determination to re-establish access by military means, the timely placing of NATO forces on a full war footing would be essential. General Norstad is also concerned that the quiet precautionary measures considered to date are not orientated towards deterrence. We therefore consider that SHAPE should assume the responsibility for military preparedness particularly as this must be related to SACEUR's Alert Measures.

10. The original directive⁹ requires LIVE OAK to plan more elaborate military measures in Europe and LIVE OAK have prepared a study¹⁰ of countermeasures which could be taken throughout Europe and in the adjoining seas to induce the USSR to desist from threatening attitudes or aggressive acts, although they planned in detail only for Berlin ground and air access measures. We consider that such measures, to be effective, would have to be implemented on a NATO basis, that the planning should therefore be the responsibility of the appropriate NATO headquarters, and that LIVE OAK should be limited to planning for operations directly concerned with re-opening access to Berlin.

11. In order to ensure that the views of the three Governments on military matters concerning Berlin are adequately represented, we consider that the Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK, should have direct access to General Norstad. This is necessary and justifiable as long as LIVE OAK retains its separate entity in the planning phase.

Operations

12. General Norstad has submitted proposals¹¹ for LIVE OAK to be used as an operating staff if Contingency Plans are implemented, envisaging an augmented staff for continuous operations, though with SHAPE and USEUCOM providing intelligence support and SHAPE a public relations element. He also thinks¹² it possible that, if operations become necessary, elements of LIVE OAK staff would have to be used to augment the existing staffs of certain field commanders, such as General Cassella.

13. The initial probe (FREE STYLE) is planned for an early stage when circumstances might not justify NATO intervention; it requires careful timing in relation to other access measures which LIVE OAK will have studied and necessitates close liaison with the Three Embassies in Bonn. The LIVE OAK staff could be used as a separate operations staff from SHAPE to meet the wishes of General Norstad, but in these circumstances we think it should be confined to the FREE STYLE operation only. It would be better in our view to integrate the LIVE OAK staff with SHAPE for the execution of all operations in Europe for the following reasons:-

(a) NATO should be in a state of readiness when

- 8 COS(61)228
- 9 Annex A to COS 876/17/7/61
- 10 Annex to COS 541/10/4/59
- 11 Annex to COS 977/9/8/61
- 12 Annex A to COS 813/4/7/61

Annex (Continued)

ground operations including the initial probe take place.

- (b) Any possible Russian action against air access operations could very quickly affect NATO as a whole. This could even precede FREE STYLE.
- (c) The air and ground operations need to be co-ordinated with SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plans.
- (d) It would in any case be advisable to use the NATO command and communications channels.

DIRECTIVE FOR LIVE OAK

14. The revised Directive for future Berlin Contingency Planning must provide the general political guidance which General Norstad requires, and this must come from the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. However, in order that the United Kingdom representative may table a draft, the Foreign Office have prepared guidance, which is incorporated with our views on future planning and operations, in a draft revised Directive at Appendix. Account has also been taken in the Directive of the United States memorandum and of the American change of view over airlift operations.

FURTHER DIRECTIONS REQUIRED FROM THE
AMBASSADORIAL GROUP OR GOVERNMENTS TO
LIVE OAK OR SHAPE

15. Now that there is general agreement between the four Powers on political aims there is an urgent need for clear political guidance from which LIVE OAK and SHAPE can proceed with military planning within limits acceptable to the three Powers. This necessary political guidance for LIVE OAK has been included in the draft revised Directive at Appendix.

16. There will also be the need for additional guidance as planning proceeds and problems of political rather than military complexity arise. Such guidance would obviously become more necessary and urgent in the event of any military measures being put into operation. Some procedure, therefore, is required whereby direction can be co-ordinated between the Tripartite Powers and the NATO Council without interruption or interference with either political purpose or military planning.

17. General Norstad will require an additional directive in his capacity as SACEUR in regard to those measures which are to be taken on a NATO basis and for which SHAPE is to have planning responsibility. This directive would have to be issued by the Standing Group on behalf of the Military Committee and after approval by the North Atlantic Council, when they have been informed formally of the details of Tripartite Contingency Planning for Berlin.

MILITARY ADVICE FOR THE AMBASSADORIAL
GROUP IN WASHINGTON

18. It was agreed* at the Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington should be the initial

Ø COS 9014/21/7/61
 + COS(61)53rd Mtg. Min 1.CA.

Annex (Continued)

co-ordinating body for the higher direction of measures relating to Berlin. Although under the terms of its 1959 directive this Group was made responsible for the overall co-ordination of Berlin contingency planning, the relationship of General Norstad to the Group was not clearly defined and no system for the provision of military advice to it was established. Both omissions must now be remedied urgently. The relationship of General Norstad has been dealt with in the draft revised Directive at Appendix. It now remains to decide how military advice should be provided to the Ambassadorial Group.

19. This problem includes the following aspects:-

- (a) Representation of national views on military measures.
- (b) Military advice on ideas arising in the Ambassadorial Group which may include proposals for action outside the NATO area.
- (c) Advice on proposals submitted by executive commanders, such as General Norstad.
- (d) Assistance in formulating directives by the Ambassadorial Group to executive commanders.

20. There are four ways in which military advice could be provided to the Ambassadorial Group to cover the requirements in paragraph 19. These are:-

- (a) By using existing national military representatives in Washington to advise their own Ambassadors individually.
- (b) By appointing separate officers to advise Ambassadors individually.
- (c) By establishing a separate military advisory group by special appointment. This body would require a separate staff. (Its members would of course still be able to advise their Ambassadors individually.)
- (d) By using the members of the Standing Group with the addition of a German (logically their representative on the Military Committee) in a separate corporate form for corporate advice to the Ambassadorial Group making use of existing organizations and staff. (Again, its members would still be free to advise their Ambassadors individually.)

The French and German Governments seem already to have adopted course (b) but we do not know which of the above methods they favour as a permanent solution.

21. The appointment of national military representatives to advise the Ambassadorial Group on an individual basis, or the establishment of a separate military advisory group, i.e. 20(a), (b) and (c) above, would in our view undermine the confidence required of NATO and confuse the responsibilities for planning

Annex to COS.5/11/10/4/59

Annex (Concluded)

and operations, particularly as we consider that any operation in Europe that may arise over the Berlin issue should be the responsibility of SACEUR. There is considerable merit if the members of the Standing Group, who have both NATO and national responsibilities, together with General Heusinger, present Chairman of the Military Committee, fulfil this function since the Standing Group is in close touch with NATO major Commanders, and through its links with the Military Committee and the NATO Council could bridge the gap between the quadripartite powers and NATO as a whole. Moreover, if advice is required on issues in the Ambassadorial Group arising from action outside the NATO area, this could be provided by members of the Standing Group in their national capacity, as at present.

22. We consider that the need for military measures to be closely related to political guidance will necessitate a direct link between the Ambassadorial Group and General Norstad, or any other major commander acting in a tripartite capacity.

CONCLUSIONS

23. We conclude that:-

- (a) The LIVE OAK Group should confine its responsibilities, under General Norstad, to the planning of access operations to Berlin, and that any operations arising therefrom in Europe must be the responsibility of SACEUR.
- (b) In the event of operations the LIVE OAK staff could be used by General Norstad as the operational staff to cover FREE STYLE but in our view should be integrated with SHAPE operational staff from the outset.
- (c) A new directive based on this division of responsibility and containing the directions required from the Ambassadorial Group is urgently needed. Draft proposals are at Appendix.
- (d) Military advice to the Ambassadorial Group could best be provided by the members of the Standing Group, enlarged to include the Germans, acting as a separate corporate body but with no change to the existing arrangement for individual advice to national political representatives. This would cover, as at present, problems which may arise outside the NATO area.

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DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL NORSTAD
FROM AMBASSADORIAL STEERING GROUP

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have, in the exercise of their special responsibility for Germany, including Berlin, approved the issue of the following directive for the future work of the LIVE OAK Planning team under your supervision. You will continue, until further notice, to act upon this directive and on such further instructions as may be agreed jointly by the Three Governments. This directive supersedes the relevant sections of the tripartite directive of 4th April, 1959.

2. The decisions on the implementation of any course of action arising from this directive, whether political, military, economic or other, must remain the responsibility of the three Governments after due consultation with the Federal Government and other Government members of NATO.

Political Aim

3. Subject to the foregoing paragraph, these Governments are agreed upon the following general principles:-

(a) Their essential requirements in regard to Berlin are:-

- (i) The maintenance of the presence and security of their forces in West Berlin.
- (ii) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
- (iii) The maintenance of freedom of physical access to West Berlin.

All plans will be directed to securing these requirements.

(b) Although every reasonable effort will be made to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Berlin question with the Soviet Government, pending such a settlement they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to demonstrate their determination to secure their requirements, at the risk of war if necessary.

(c) These steps will be designed to render them, and the NATO alliance, better able to deal with a conflict if the Soviet Government is not deterred from action which threatens the essential requirements set out above.

The Principles Governing Berlin Contingency Planning in the Military Field

4. In the event of substantial and continuing Soviet or East German interference with access to and from West Berlin, Allied

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and/or civilian, Allied counter-action will have the following objects:-

- (a) So far as possible, to place on the other side the onus of being the first to take aggressive action.
- (b) To avoid a situation arising in which the West has the choice only between humiliation and all-out nuclear war.
- (c) To retain as great a range of choice as possible both as regards the type of counter-action taken and its timing.
- (d) To leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.
- (e) To leave the Soviet Government under no illusion that it can expect to restrict hostilities which may break out to a limited conventional engagement in which East German forces alone, or Soviet conventional forces in limited numbers, can deal successfully with Western military operations, and without risk of escalation.
- (f) To avoid prejudicing the ability of NATO forces to undertake their assigned tasks if more general hostilities occur.
- (g) To avoid any infringement of East German territory or air space (i.e. leaving the air corridors or the autobahn) until enemy action leaves no alternative.
- (h) Until hostilities become general, to use only forces of the Three Powers in operations.

The Outline of Planning

5. Planning should take account of the following factors:-

- (a) An initial probe of Soviet intentions may be required to establish deliberate physical obstruction of Allied access.
- (b) The establishment of adequate stockpiles in West Berlin, and the possible use of garrison/civil airlifts, would provide the West with the time required to consider further moves.
- (c) An airlift would be accompanied by significant economic counter-measures and intensified military preparations.
- (d) In the event of threats to flight safety or interference with flight in the air corridors, suitable action should be taken to provide air support.
- (e) As wide a variety as possible of more elaborate military measures on the ground access route should be planned but their implementation would be delayed until all other reasonable alternative courses had failed. They could not, of themselves, re-open access

to Berlin in the face of Soviet determination to prevent it, and must be planned so as not to prejudice wider NATO operations should the need for these occur.

The Tasks and Planning Responsibilities of LIVE OAK

6. The LIVE OAK Group is responsible to you for plans to cover the following contingencies:-

- (a) Initial probes of Soviet intentions.
- (b) More elaborate military measures.
- (c) Measures in support of air access.

7. Plans for precautionary and preparatory measures previously the responsibility of LIVE OAK will henceforth become the responsibility of SACEUR who will also assume responsibility for planning counter measures in Allied Command Europe which are outside the Central Region.

8. LIVE OAK should remain a separate planning group within SHAPE, with direct access to yourself and to CINCPAC and CINCUSAF for planning purposes.

9. The conduct of any operations that may arise from these plans will be under the command and control of SACEUR through his operations staff at SHAPE.

10. You are requested to:-

- (a) Re-examine existing plans in the light of this directive and to make such recommendations to the Three Governments as you consider necessary, and inform the Federal Government through the German Liaison Officer at LIVE OAK.
- (b) Prepare and submit plans for the integration of the LIVE OAK staff into NATO Headquarters at the appropriate level and time and to ensure the continuity of military control during the handover to SACEUR.
- (c) Establish appropriate arrangements for liaison with the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.